Background and interests
I am a PhD candidate at CREED under the supervision of Shaul Shalvi and Theo Offerman since October 2015. I am affiliated with the Faculty of Economic and Business of University of Amsterdam. I hold a master degree in Social Psychology from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (BGU) and a Bachelor degree in Psychology and Management from BGU as well.
I am interested in decision making and behavioral ethics. I study the dark side of pro sociality, specifically how people's pro social tendencies, such as reciprocity and cooperation, leads to breaking ethical rules and corruption. Additionally, I am interested in the underlying mechanisms (e.g., attention allocation) that enables people to create justifications for their lies.
PUBLICATIONS 2022
Shalvi, Shaul, Jantsje M. Mol, Catherine Molho, Linh Vu, Margarita Leib, Ivan Soraperra (2022) Psychological Science for a Responsible Sharing Economy Current Opinion in Psychology 44, PDF-file Link to article The sharing economy is fueled by trust, which allows strangers to cooperate. To share responsibly, one needs to be aware of the various consequences sharing has on interacting and third parties. When transparency about such consequences is lacking, mutual trust among interacting parties may encourage people to cooperate and share, in turn creating unintended negative impact. Psychologists have long studied trust and cooperation, yet few insights from psychological science have been used to understand the sharing economy. Here, we propose that evoking trust may paradoxically increase motivated information processing leading people to share irresponsibly by ignoring the negative consequences sharing has on others. We review three conditions under which evoking trust may lead to irresponsible sharing: ethical blind spots, willful ignorance, and misinformation. We propose that transparent information is key to enable and encourage responsible sharing. More psychological research is needed to better understand how this flourishing, trust-based industry can be shaped to encourage safe, cooperative, and responsible sharing.
Margarita Leib, Karin Kee, David D Loschelder and Marieke Roskes (2022) Perspective taking does not moderate the price precision effect, but indirectly affects counteroffers to asking prices Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 101, PDF-file Link to article Precise asking-prices (e.g., $249,800), compared with round ones (e.g., $250,000), are stronger anchors, leading buyers to counter closer to the asking-price. This ‘precision effect’ is driven by (i) higher evaluation of the seller's competence, and (ii) buyers using a finer-grained numerical scale when the asking-price is precise compared with round. But are buyers more susceptible to precise anchors, the more they take the seller's perspective? If so, what are the underlying mechanisms leading to this increased susceptibility? We examine the potential moderating role of trait (Experiment 1) and manipulated (Experiment 2) perspective-taking on the price precision effect and its underlying mechanisms. We test the prediction that the more buyers take the seller's perspective, the more they will evaluate a precise-opening seller as competent, which in turn will increase buyers' susceptibility to precise prices (H1). We further test two competing predictions regarding the moderating role (H2a) of perspective-taking versus lack thereof (H2b) on buyers' use of a finer-grained numerical scale when countering a precise asking-price. Results revealed that precise asking-prices lead to counteroffers closer to the asking-price. This price precision effect was driven by the scale granularity, but not the perception of seller's competence mechanism. Further, perspective-taking did not moderate the price precision effect. Exploratory analyses revealed that perspective-taking leads to higher perception of seller's competence, which in turn leads to counteroffers that are closer to the asking-price. Overall, both price precision and perspective-taking shape counteroffers (but not in an interaction), making the two factors important in negotiation processes. Margarita Leib, Nils Köbis, Ivan Soraperra, Ori Weisel, and Shaul Shalvi (2022) Collaborative dishonesty: A meta-analytic review. Psychological Bulletin 147, PDF-file Link to article Although dishonesty is often a social phenomenon, it is primarily studied in individual settings. However, people frequently collaborate and engage in mutual dishonest acts. We report the first meta-analysis on collaborative dishonesty, analyzing 87,771 decisions (21 behavioral tasks; k = 123; n participants = 10,923). We provide an overview of all tasks used to measure collaborative dishonesty, and inform theory by conducting moderation analyses. Results reveal that collaborative dishonesty is higher (a) when financial incentives are high, (b) in lab than field studies, (c) when third parties experience no negative consequences, (d) in the absence of experimental deception, and (e) when groups consist of more males and (f) younger individuals. Further, in repeated interactions, group members’ behavior is correlated—participants lie more when their partners lie—and lying increases as the task progresses. These findings are in line with the justified ethicality theoretical perspective, suggesting prosocial concerns increase collaborative dishonesty, whereas honest-image concerns attenuate it. We discuss how findings inform theory, setting an agenda for future research on the collaborative roots of dishonesty. Margarita Leib, Nils Köbis, Ivan Soraperra, Ori Weisel, and Shaul Shalvi (2022) Collaborative dishonesty: A meta-analytic review Psychological Bulletin 147, PDF-file Link to article Although dishonesty is often a social phenomenon, it is primarily studied in individual settings. However, people frequently collaborate and engage in mutual dishonest acts. We report the first meta-analysis on collaborative dishonesty, analyzing 87,771 decisions (21 behavioral tasks; k = 123; n participants = 10,923). We provide an overview of all tasks used to measure collaborative dishonesty, and inform theory by conducting moderation analyses. Results reveal that collaborative dishonesty is higher (a) when financial incentives are high, (b) in lab than field studies, (c) when third parties experience no negative consequences, (d) in the absence of experimental deception, and (e) when groups consist of more males and (f) younger individuals. Further, in repeated interactions, group members’ behavior is correlated—participants lie more when their partners lie—and lying increases as the task progresses. These findings are in line with the justified ethicality theoretical perspective, suggesting prosocial concerns increase collaborative dishonesty, whereas honest-image concerns attenuate it. We discuss how findings inform theory, setting an agenda for future research on the collaborative roots of dishonesty.
PUBLICATIONS 2021
Leib, Margarita, Nils Köbis, Marc Francke, Shaul Shalvi and Marieke Roskes (2021) Precision in a Seller’s Market: Round Asking Prices Lead to Higher Counteroffers and Selling Prices Management Science 67, 11048-1055 PDF-file Link to article Precise, compared with round asking-prices, are stronger anchors, leading to counteroffers and final agreements that are closer to the asking-price. Consequently, a popular advice for sellers is to set precise asking-prices. We propose a Precision-in-Context Theory: for sellers who wish the maximize profit, precise asking-prices are beneficial in a buyer’s market, in which buyers counter below the asking-price, but detrimental in a seller’s market, in which buyers counter above the asking-price. Four pre-registered experiments (N=4,078) support the Precision-in-Context theory, showing that in a seller’s market, precise asking-prices lead to lower counteroffers. The effect is driven by buyers’ use of a finer-grained pricing scale when countering precise asking-prices. Analyzing Amsterdam’s 2017 real estate transactions (N=5,713), in which 70% of the properties were sold above the asking-price, revealed that increasing the roundness of the asking-price by one decimal was associated with an increase of 0.6% in the selling-price, equivalent to €2,099 on average.
PUBLICATIONS 2019
Leib, Margarita; Moran, Simone; Shalvi, Shaul (2019) Dishonest helping and harming after (un)fair treatment Judgment and Decision Making 14, 423–439 PDF-file People experience fair and unfair treatment daily, and at times may react by breaking ethical rules and lying. Here, we assess
the extent to which individuals engage in dishonest behavior aimed at helping or harming others after they experience (un)fair
treatment. Across three financially incentivized experiments, recipients in a dictator game received a fair or unfair amount and
then could, by means of dishonesty, inflate or deflate their counterparts’ pay. Results show that dishonest helping is a common
and robust behavior. Individuals lie to help others after fair, unfair, and no prior treatment. Dishonest harming, however, is
less prevalent. Only after unfair treatment, some, but not all, individuals engage in dishonest harming. Dishonest harming was
associated with high levels of anger and disappointment, and low levels of gratitude. Interestingly, the source of (un)fairness,
whether it is intentional or not, did not attenuate peoples’ behavior, suggesting that dishonest reactions to (un)fairness were
driven by the mere (un)fair treatment, and not by a motivation to reciprocate an (un)fair counterpart Leib, Margarita; Pittarello, Andrea; Gordon-Hecker, Tom; Shalvi, Shaul; Roskes Marieke (2019) Loss framing increases self-serving mistakes (but does not alter attention) Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 85, Link to article In ambiguous settings, people are tempted to make self-serving mistakes. Here, we assess whether people make more self-serving mistakes to minimize losses compared with maximize gains. Results reveal that participants are twice as likely to make self-serving mistakes to reduce losses compared to increase gains. We further trace participants' eye movements to gain insight into the process underlying self-serving mistakes in losses and gains. We find that tempting, self-serving information does not capture more attention in loss, compared to gain framing. Rather, in loss framing, people are more likely to report the tempting, self-serving information they observed. The results imply that rather than diverting attention away from tempting information, reducing people's motivation to make self-serving mistakes, and framing goals as gains rather than losses are promising ways to decrease the occurrence of self-serving mistakes. In turn, this fosters environments with more accuracy and fewer motivated mistakes.
PUBLICATIONS 2018
Gross, Jorg, Margarita Leib, Theo Offerman and Shaul Shalvi (2018) Ethical Free Riding: When Honest People Find Dishonest Partners Psychological Science Link to article Corruption is often the product of coordinated rule violations. Here, we investigated how such corrupt collaboration emerges and spreads when people can choose their partners versus when they cannot. Participants were assigned a partner and could increase their payoff by coordinated lying. After several interactions, they were either free to choose whether to stay with or switch their partner or forced to stay with or switch their partner. Results reveal that both dishonest and honest people exploit the freedom to choose a partner. Dishonest people seek a partner who will also lie—a “partner in crime.” Honest people, by contrast, engage in ethical free riding: They refrain from lying but also from leaving dishonest partners, taking advantage of their partners’ lies. We conclude that to curb collaborative corruption, relying on people’s honesty is insufficient. Encouraging honest individuals not to engage in ethical free riding is essential.
PUBLICATIONS 2017
Soraperra, Ivan, Ori Weise, Ro'i Zultan, Sys Kochavi, Margarita Leib, Hadar Shalev and Shaul Shalvi (2017) The bad consequences of teamwork Economics Letters PDF-file Link to article People are rather dishonest when working on collaborative tasks. We experimentally study whether this is driven by the collaborative situation or by mere exposure to dishonest norms. In the collaborative treatment, two participants in a pair receive a payoff (equal to the reported outcome) only if both report the same die-roll outcome. In the norm exposure treatment, participants receive the same information regarding their partner’s action as in the collaborative treatment, but receive payoffs based only on their own reports. We find that average dishonesty is similarly high with and without collaboration, but the frequency of dyads in which both players are honest is lower in collaboration than in the norm exposure setting. 