UvA

Future seminars

 

2024-04-25 Andreas Glöckner (University of Cologne, Max Planck Institute)
Modeling Social Preferences in Cross-National Interactions.
Room: E5.22, 16:00-17:15.
When making decisions, individuals do not only take into account their own payoffs but often additionally consider the consequences for others. Models of social preferences (e.g., social value orientation) aim to describe exactly how outcome for the self and for others are integrated. Models widely differ concerning whether and how various factors are taken into account. They contain for example different relative weights for the own and the other outcome, take into account inequality (i.e. differences in outcomes for self and other) and/or efficiency concerns (i.e. the sum of outcomes). Some models, such as Jenkins et al. (2018), also differentiate between cases of advantageous and disadvantageous inequality. Jenkins et al. suggested a Social Perception-Weighted (SPW) model of social valuation, which takes into account perceived competence and warmth from the stereotype content model and show its superiority in predicting behavior. We conduct a comprehensive model comparison by (i) applying SPW to cross-national interactions, (ii) testing SPW against competing models, and (iii) extending SPW by including further variables. We analyze choices from an incentivized, multi-national study (N = 6,182). In the experiment, individuals from 25 nations allocated money between themselves and individuals from the own and each other nation. Stereotype perception, perceived conflict between nations and further factors were measured. Based on these model comparisons, we identify relevant structures and factors and suggest an extended, integrative model of social preference for cross-national interactions taking into account social perception and further psychological influence factors.

 

2024-05-02 Roel van Veldhuizen (Lund Univerisity)
Decomposing Trust (with Dirk Engelmann, Jana Friedrichsen, Pauline Vorjohann and Joachim Winter).
Room: E0.03, 16:00-17:15.
Trust is an important condition for economic growth and other economic outcomes. Previous studies suggest that the decision to trust is driven by a combination of risk attitudes, distributional preferences, betrayal aversion, and beliefs about the probability of being reciprocated. We compare the results of a binary trust game to the results of a series of control treatments that by design remove the effect of one or more of these components of trust. This allows us to decompose variation in trust behavior into its underlying factors. Our results imply that beliefs are a key driver of trust, and that the additional components only play a role when beliefs about reciprocity are sufficiently optimistic. Our decomposition approach can be applied to other settings where multiple factors that are not mutually independent affect behavior. We discuss its advantages over the more traditional approach of controlling for measures of relevant factors derived from separate tasks in regressions, in particular with respect to measurement error and omitted variable bias.

 

2024-05-16 Simeon Schudy (Ulm University )
TBD.
Room: TBD, 16:00-17:15.
TBD

 

2024-05-23 Katie Coffman (Harvard Business School)
TBD.
Room: TBD, 16:00-17:15.
TBD

 

2024-05-30 Ragan Petrie (Texas A&M University)
TBD.
Room: TBD, 16:00-17:15.
TBD

 

2024-06-06 Tingting Ding (TBA)
TBA.
Room: TBA, 16:00-17:15.
TBA

 

2024-06-13 Songfa Zhong (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)
TBD.
Room: TBD, 16:00-17:15.
TBD