UvA

Future seminars

 

2017-09-25 Marie Claire Villeval (University of Lyon)
Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma.
Room: E0.14, 16:00-17:15.
The existing literature on ostracism in social dilemma games has focused on the impact of the threat of exclusion on cooperation within groups but so far, little attention has been paid to the behavior of the excluded members after their reintegration. This paper studies the effect of exclusion by peers followed by reintegration on cooperation once excluded individuals are readmitted in their group. Using a negatively framed public good game, we manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators although it is not an equilibrium strategy. Exclusion has a positive impact on cooperation and compliance to the group norm of withdrawal after reintegration when exclusion is followed by a quick rather than a slow reintegration and that the length of exclusion is chosen by the group. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. Post-exclusion cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish.

 

2017-10-19 Jason Dana (Yale University)
Competition and the nature of gender discrimination: Evidence from The Price Is Right.
Room: E5.22, 16:00-17:15.
No abstract available.

 

2017-10-26 Michaela Pagel (Columbia Business School)
TBA.
Room: E0.14, 16:00-17:15.
No abstract available.

 

2017-11-23 Alex Possajennikov (University of Nottingham)
Preventing the Tyranny of the Majority - Experiment on the Choice of Voting Thresholds under the Veil of Ignorance.
Room: tba, 16:00-17:15.
In democracies, an absolute majority of voters may choose policies that are harmful to others, even when the harm is larger than the benefit to the majority. We study how individuals choose threshold rules in voting situations, including where sub- or super-majority thresholds are optimal. In our experiment individuals choose thresholds knowing distributions of possible valuations of alternatives but not knowing their own valuation (veil of ignorance). As is optimal, subjects do propose more extreme thresholds for more skewed distributions. However, threshold choices are biased towards simple majority rule, leading to substantial welfare losses. We also identify systematic changes in subjects' decisions in response to variations in distributions of valuations, even when these variations do not change the optimal threshold choice.

 

2018-03-01 Yves Le Yaouanq (LMU Munich)
TBA.
Room: , 16:00-17:15.
No abstract available.

 

2018-05-03 Rachel Kranton (Duke University)
TBA.
Room: , 16:00-17:15.
No abstract available.

 

2018-06-21 Anya Samek (University of Southern California)
TBA.
Room: , 16:00-17:15.
No abstract available.