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This paper experimentally investigates the relationship between an investor and a project manager. Project managers choose from a pool of projects, the success probabilities of which are uncertain. Information about the future success probability of a project is gained by observing its outcome. Investors can change projects, but also have to change project managers if they want to do so. An additional joint project or a voluntary transfer precedes their interaction. We hypothesize that investors favor projects that are managed by project managers with whom they have shared positive experiences in the past, even though these past experiences do not provide any information about a project's success probability. The role of this social element is isolated using a control treatment in which the role of the project manager does not exist. Interaction through a voluntary transfer plays a clear and significant role in the investors' decision making via bonding, whereas the influence of merely sharing a positive or negative experience proves more complex.

For reward-based crowdfunding, we introduce the strategy-proof Generalized Moulin-Shenker mechanism (GMS) and compare its performance to the prevailing All-Or-Nothing mechanism (AON). Theoretically, GMS outperforms AON in equilibrium profit and funding success. We test these predictions experimentally, distinguishing between a sealed-bid and a dynamic version of GMS. We find that the dynamic GMS outperforms the sealed-bid GMS. It performs better than AON when the producer aims at maximizing funding success. For crowdfunding in practice, this suggests that the current standard of financing projects may be improved upon by implementing a crowdfunding mechanism that is similar to the dynamic GMS.

Information about the consequences of our consumption choices can be unwelcome, and people sometimes avoid it. We investigate a situation where one person possesses information that is inconvenient for another, and study why and when they decide to transmit that information. We introduce a simple and portable experimental game to analyze transmission of inconvenient information. In this game, a Sender can inform a Receiver at a small cost about a negative externality associated with a tempting and profitable action for the Receiver. The results from our online experiment (N = 1,512) show that Senders transmit more information for large negative externalities. Sender's decisions are largely driven by their own preferences for information. However, some Senders take the Receiver's feelings into account, by transmitting evidence of positive externalities or by suppressing negative information upon the Receiver's request. Understanding the decision to share inconvenient information matters, as it will affect the personal and political will to address important externalities and can inform strategies to encourage the transmission of inconvenient information within organizations.

Reorientation of attention to threatening stimuli is a fundamental part of human cognition. Such interaction between cogni-tive and affective processes is often associated with faster response times. In the present study, the role of the right angular gyrus (AG) in reorienting to threat is examined. An exogenous spatial cueing paradigm was adopted with threatening and nonthreatening targets. Threat was induced by means of differential fear conditioning of the target. Single pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was applied to the right AG at different stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA) after target onset (range 30–300 ms). Transcranial magnetic stimulation was predicted to interfere at an earlier SOA with reorienting (during invalidly cued trials) to threatening targets. Even though an overall decrement in performance to targets contralateral to TMS stimulation was found, TMS to right AG did not specifically affect reorienting, neither to safe nor to threatening targets. We suggest that detection of biologically significant stimuli outside the focus of attention may depend more on the ventral frontoparietal rather than dorsal frontoparietal network of attention.

Attitudes towards fairness and redistribution differ along socio-economic lines. To understand their formation, we conduct a large-scale experiment on attention to merit and luck and the effect of attention on fairness decisions. Randomly advantaged subjects pay less attention to information about true merit and retain more economic surplus, and this effect persists in subsequent impartial decisions. Attention also has a causal role: encouraging subjects to look at merit reduces the effect of an advantaged position on allocations. This suggests that attention-based policy interventions may be effective in reducing polarized views on inequality.