UvA

Future seminars

 

2024-09-12 Gianluca Grimalda (Passau University)
Market integration, egalitarianism, and reward of merit: An experimental analysis from Papua New Guinea small-scale societies.
Room: E5.22, 16:00-17:15.
Extant literature proposes and finds empirical support for both a positive and a negative relationship between market integration and pro-sociality. According to a first strand of literature, market interactions help develop generalized pro-sociality, which extends to complete strangers the sense of particularized pro-sociality that is normally reserved to one’s family, clan, or kins in traditional societies. A second strand of theoretical literature posits that market interactions erode altruism. We test the relationship between market integration and tolerance of inequality – one relevant aspect of pro-sociality – in 30 villages of Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. Such villages were randomly selected from the census list within six groups differing upon the ease of access to the main market towns of the province. Since this society is transitioning from self-subsistence to market integration, it provides a suitable setting to test the above hypothesis. We measure tolerance of inequality through the “power-to-take” game, in which two players with different initial allocations make a proposal over how to divide the sum of initial earnings. A third impartial player also makes a proposal. We measure market integration through the share of calories coming from market purchases vis-à-vis self-subsistence. Overall, we find no significant relationship between market integration and tolerance of inequality. Rather, behaviour seems highly variable in each village groups. We find propensity for either egalitarian or non-egalitarian divisions both in relatively highly integrated and little integrated villages. Nonetheless, greater market integration seems to affect social norms justifying inequality and other mechanisms supporting cooperation.

 

2024-09-19 Andrzej Baranski-Madrigal (NYU Abu Dhabi)
Prevalence and Predictors of Exclusionary Behavior Across the Six Inhabited Continents.
Room: E5.22, 16:00-17:15.
Primates are known to engage in exclusionary behavior, forming alliances to block a minority from accessing scarce resources. Humans are no exception, and examples of exclusionary behavior abound in political, business, and social settings. However, despite its socio-economic relevance, little is known about the prevalence and determinants of such behavior worldwide. Conducting an experimental game in which a group divides resources by majority rule, we document considerable global heterogeneity in exclusionary behavior. Whereas exclusion is modal in some countries, inclusive behavior is the norm in others. Despite significant cross-country variability, we nevertheless find that individual-level characteristics matter similarly across contexts. Men, individuals with high strategic reasoning abilities, and ideologically right-leaning individuals, are consistently and substantially more exclusionary. Cross-country differences in the formation of exclusionary alliances correlate with cultural variables measuring the acceptance of power inequalities and hierarchies, suggesting a role for culture. Our findings carry important implications for decision-making bodies, as they indicate that the identity of decision-makers and the culture in which they are embedded can affect how equitably resources are divided.